Does Liberté = Egalité? A Survey of the Empirical Evidence on the Links between Political Democracy and Income Inequality by Mark Gradstein & Branko Milanovic






Phone: +49 (89) 9224-1410/1425
Fax: +49 (89) 9224-1409
http://www.CESifo.de
DOES LIBERTÉ = EGALITÉ?
A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON THE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL
DEMOCRACY AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Mark Gradstein
Branko Milanovic*
Working Paper No. 261CESifo Working Paper No. 261
March 2000
DOES LIBERTÉ = EGALITÉ?
A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE
LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND
INCOME INEQUALITY
Abstract
The relationship between the distribution of political rights and that of economic
resources has been studied both theoretically and empirically.  This paper
reviews the existing literature and, in particular, the available empirical
evidence.  Our reading of the literature suggests that formal exclusion from the
political process through restrictions on voting franchise appears to have
caused a high degree of economic inequality, and democratization in the form
of franchise expansion has typically led to an expansion in redistribution, at least
in the small sample of episodes studied.  Similarly,  and more emphatically
compared to the ambiguous results of the earlier research, more recent
evidence indicates an inverse relationship between other measures of
democracy, based on civil liberties and political rights, and inequality.  The
transition experience of the East European countries, however, seems to some
extent to go against these conclusions. This, in turn, opens possible new vistas
for research, namely the need to incorporate the length of democratic
experience and the role played by ideology and social values.
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  1.  Introduction
The relationship between political structure and economic performance has for some time
been a subject of scrutiny for researchers.  In particular, the links between the extent to
which an economy is democratized and its income growth and income distribution have been
examined.  While the studies on the first of the above links has been recently surveyed by
several authors,
1 the second link has received much less attention.  The objective of this
survey is to bridge this gap by focusing on the empirical evidence with regard to the second
link, asking specifically, whether or not democratization should be expected to bring about a
decrease in income inequality.
That political factors should play an important role in shaping inequality should not
come as much a surprise.  While economic theory has much to say about efficiency in the
allocation of resources, as described by the Pareto frontier, it is much less eloquent about the
precise point(s) on the frontier likely to be reached in reality, claiming that this depends on
normative/political considerations.  The recent political economy literature tries to tackle this
latter issue by specifying the institutional details of the political process, which resolve
distributional conflicts (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson
and Tabellini, 1994).  In particular, a subset of this literature, surveyed in greater detail
below, deals specifically with the relationship between the distribution of political power and
the distribution of economic resources, which is the focus of this survey.
It might be tempting to think that a more equal distribution of political power, that is
more democracy, would necessarily imply less economic inequality.  However, a cursory
review of the recent development history in countries of East Asia and East Europe, reveals
this intuition to be misleading.  In fact, some East Asian countries, such as Taiwan and South4
Korea, have achieved a relatively equal distribution of income when autocratic regimes
prevailed, and, ironically, in the post communist countries of East Europe, inequality seems to
have increased during the course of democratization.  These examples call for a more formal
empirical look at the co-evolution of democratization and inequality across countries.
Indeed, the empirical research of the subject has been vibrant in recent years.  The
issue being of an inherently interdisciplinary nature, has been addressed by sociologists,
political scientists, and economists.  The early research conducted in the 60’s and the 70’s
made evident the methodological issues that have to be faced by researchers in the field, such
as measurement problems, sample composition, model specification and others. More
recently, measurement of some key variables (particularly of inequality, but also of
democracy) has been significantly refined, which has allowed for a better reassessment of the
evidence.
      Our main purpose is to briefly review the theories that have been developed on the
relationship between democracy and inequality and, in particular, to summarize the results of
the empirical research.  Since the early empirical studies of the 60’s and the 70’s, have been
comprehensively surveyed elsewhere (see Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990) the present coverage
focuses on the most recent evidence.
The survey proceeds in the following order.  The next section sketches the theories
on the relationship between democracy and inequality.  Section 3 then discusses some
methodological issues associated with empirical tests of these theories.  Section 4 reviews the
empirical evidence, while section 5 pays closer attention to the recent transition process in the
post communist countries of East Europe.  Finally, concluding remarks are presented in
section 6.5
  2.  Outline of the theoretical arguments
Economists and social thinkers have long held that by reducing inequalities in the distribution
of political power, democracy helps to reduce inequalities of wealth and status.
2  The view
that political democracy leads to greater economic equality was commonly held in the late
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century period, and economic consequences of democracy
have been in the center of debates concerning the right to vote and to organize during the first
half of the nineteenth century. One of the main arguments has been that democracy,
specifically universal suffrage and the freedom to form unions, threatens property: endowed
with political power in the form of universal suffrage, those who suffer as a consequence of
private property will attempt to use this power to expropriate the riches. British electoral
reforms, in particular reduction of the suffrage in the wake of the French revolution, is
generally the best-known, and the most researched, case. But the same problems were
present throughout Europe: only some 10 percent of adult male Italians, Dutch and Belgians
had the right of vote as late as 1880 (Flora, Kraus and Pfenning 1983, Lindert 1989); less
than 2 percent of adult males were enfranchised in Hungary on the eve of World War I
(Taylor, 1967). The dilemma was eloquently summarized  in 1871 by the Spanish stateman
Canavas del Castillo: rebutting those who complained about electoral fraud, he wrote: „to
have to choose between the permanent falsification of universal suffrage and its abolition is
not to have to choose between universal suffrage and preservation of property.“ (Ubieto et.
al. 1972, p. 731).
In modern times, the theoretical case on the link between democracy and inequality
has been forcefully presented by Lipset (1959) and Lenski (1966). Lipset argued that
democratic political structures lead to elections that serve as the expression of the democratic6
class struggle. Citizens vote for parties that appeal primarily to either working-class or
middle-class interests. The extension of the franchise since the last century to include those
with little property and other assets has vastly increased political competition in industrial
societies, and has moved politics toward the left. Similarly, for Lenski, the „new democratic
ideology“ legitimates a major redistribution of political power in favor of the majority -
namely, the disadvantaged elements of society. This increased political equality has led to
more social equality because the major electoral demand made on modern political elites has
been for a more egalitarian distribution of material goods.
The construcof Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) is the economists’ counterpart of
the above argument.  They exhibit a formal pure redistribution model, whereby taxes, which
are proportional to income, are used to provide a lump-sum payment.  The tax rate,
therefore, represents the extent of redistribution, and voters differ with regard to their political
preferences: a higher endowment (of abilities, hence income) indicates the preference of a
lower tax rate.  The equilibrium tax rate is a decreasing function of the ratio between the
income of the decisive voter and the average income.  Democratization, specifically,
expansion of the voting franchise makes a poorer individual to become decisive, thereby
leading to higher redistributive taxes and lower inequality.  Most recently, this model has been
recast in a growth framework by Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, and Persson and Tabellini,
1994, the tax being interpreted as an investment tax.  Such an approach has dynamic
implications that indicates ceteris paribus a decrease in inequality over time as the voting
franchise is expanded.  Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993, reached a similar conclusion in a
framework wherein tax revenues are used to provide a uniform level of public education.
Let us now take a few moments to review a simple variant of the basic model, which
has become intellectually influential in shaping the view on the relationship between7
democracy and inequality.  Consider an overlapping generations economy with a continuum
of households, indexed by i, each comprising two members, young and old, so that the total
population remains constant over time.  The households differ with respect to their income
endowment and, in particular, in each period t, household i allocates post-fisc income yit
between current consumption, cit, and investment, kit+1 according to the budget constraint:
yit = cit + kit+1 (1)
Next-period pre-tax income equals At+1kit+1, where At+1 is an exogenously given productivity
parameter increasing over time.  Post-fisc income is determined as a function of the pre-fisc
income as well as of a politically determined redistributive policy.  Specifically,
yit+1 = At+1 [(1-qt)kit+1 + qtkt+1 ] (2)
where kt+1 denotes the average amount of investment and 0 ￿ qt ￿ 1 is the redistributive
parameter.  The specification in (2) implies that pre-fisc income is taxed at a flat rate, qt, and
the proceeds are redistributed as a lump-sum payment (qtkt+1).  Note that the redistribution
is of a progressive nature, more so the larger is qt; in particular, a higher value of qt implies a
leftward shift in the Lorenz curve (hence, a decrease in inequality).
Household utility derives from consumption and from anticipated next-period post
fisc income:
U(cit, yit+1) (3)
where U is assumed to satisfy the standard assumptions.
Let y* denote the income requirement for enfranchisement, so that only individuals
whose income is higher than y* are allowed to vote.
3  We envision in each period t a two-
stage decision making process.  In the first stage, the enfranchised old vote over the
redistributive parameter qt.  After that is determined by a majority vote, each old member of
the household allocates her income between consumption and investment according to (1) so8
as to maximize her utility (3) and anticipating the determination of future income according to
(2).  The political-economic equilibrium consists of a redistributive parameter, which is
undefeated by a majority vote in a pairwise comparison with any alternative and optimal
consumption-investment choices.
The equilibrium analysis proceeds backwards.  In the second stage, each household
makes its consumption-investment decisions taking the redistributive parameter as given;
focusing on the internal solution this implies the following first order condition:
-U1 + U2 At+1(1-qt) = 0 (4)
In the first stage voting over redistribution takes place.  Employing the envelope theorem,
differentiation of (3) with respect to qt  reveals that the preferred value of the redistributive
parameter for household i is determined from the following equation:
kt+1 - kit+1 +qt dkt/dqt = 0 (5)
Further analysis of (5) shows that, under mild assumptions, the preferred level of
redistribution, qt, is a monotonically decreasing function of income.  This implies (see Gans
and Smart, 1996) that a political-economic equilibrium exists whereby the median-income
household among all enfranchised households is decisive in determining qt.  Furthermore, a
decrease in y*, that is expansion of the franchise, results in a higher value of the redistributive
parameter.  Intuitively, the poorer a household, the higher the preferred level of redistribution.
As political participation of the poor increases because of the franchise expansion, therefore,
the more aggressive redistribution becomes with the resulting decrease in inequality.  This
model of redistribution predicts, therefore, an inverse relationship between democracy and
inequality.
A somewhat related idea which leads to the same basic result is based on a different
approach to political processes.  Becker, 1983, and Pelzman, 1976, assume that these9
political processes guided by the struggle among interest groups.  Enfranchisement empowers
the poor to become more effective in exerting political influence thereby increasing their share
of economic resources.  Plotnick, 1986, and Kristov et al., 1992, elaborate on this idea and
test it empirically.
4
Justman and Gradstein, 1999a, reach a slightly different conclusion in a related
framework, whereby initially, as long as the income of the decisive voter is higher than the
average income, inequality increases due to the redistribution from the poor to the rich and
only afterwards decreases. This indicates an inverse U-shape (or curvilinear) relationship
between democracy and inequality, one which had also been stipulated in Huntington and
Nelson, 1976.
Vice versa, the causality relationship has been challenged and, in particular, it has
also been argued that extreme inequalities in wealth undermine democratic political structures,
see Dahl, 1971.  The general argument is that concentrated economic resources may leave
the door open for the politically powerful rich to prevent political reforms that extend rights
and liberties to the poor.  Such actions may range from direct military suppression to more
subtle controls such as limitations on access to education and the control of information
through ownership and censorship of the mass media.  An authoritarian government can
repress reactions against these inequalities, while a democracy cannot indefinitely do so and
remain democratic. In sum, the effect of inequality on democracy is anticipated because
concentrated economic rewards lead to similar concentrated political resources, all of which
undermine political equality.  Acemoglu and Robinson, 1999, present a different argument
that reaches a similar conclusion.  They claim that inequality makes democracy more costly
for the ruling rich elite due to the pressure for redistribution by the poor masses that it10
unavoidably creates.  Therefore, inequality destabilizes democracy in the sense that the elite is
likely to mount a coup to prevent democracy from functioning.
Finally, some researchers have argued for a positive relationship between democracy
and inequality.  Beitz, 1982, suggests that authoritarian regimes are more likely to pursue
egalitarian development policies than are democratic regimes because they may be better
able to protect the interests of the poor.  Thus, although democracies are more receptive to
claims made by voters, they fail to treat the voters equally as sources of redistributive claims.
Acemoglu and Robinson, 1998, argue that when disenfranchised, the poor have an access to
a revolutionary technology, thus posing a threat to the enfranchised rich.  This provides an
incentive for the rich to co-opt the poor by expanding the voting franchise.  This model seems
to suggest that extreme inequality, though not moderate levels of inequality, can be associated
with eventual democratization.
3. Methodological issues
Several important conceptual and methodissues face researchers interested in studying
democracy and inequality, which can broadly be classified into: measurement problems and
selection bias.
A. Measurement problems.
  (a)  Income inequality11
The difficulties in accurately measuring income inequality are well known. Data on income
distribution are many times heterogeneous in regard to the timing of the observations, the
definition of income and  income recipient, the duration over which income is recorded, the
proportion of the population covered, and the nature of the data collection procedure, which
makes international comparisons exceedingly difficult. Some of the sources of this
heterogeneity include whether the income figures are net (after cash transfers and taxes),
gross (after transfers but inclusive of taxes) or factor only (before either taxes or transfers);
whether income recipients are households or individuals; and whether the income figures are
representative of the nation as a whole or refer only to certain regions or cities. Also, the
dates the income inequality figures refer to in existing data banks vary across nations.
Consequently, a good portion of the observed country differences in inequality may simply
reflect measurement artifacts. These data problems are yet further complicated by the fact
that there are a number of data sources available, which somewhat differ in terms of
coverage and some of the figures reported; they force research designs to be cross-sectional,
which gives one very little leverage in addressing questions posed in dynamic terms. A major
improvement took place only recently with the release of the Deininger-Squire panel data on
Gini coefficients and income shares (covering the period 1960-96 and some 80 countries)
which represents a major step on the road to full data standardization. The data set is
reviewed in detail in Deininger and Squire, 1996, who also provide a detailed guide for its
use.
The data problems have particularly plagued the testing of the median voter
hypotheses—a crucial hypothesis for our purposes—because  the way the hypothesis is
theoretically couched requires access to individual  factor incomes. This is so because people
vote on taxes and transfers based on their factor income levels, and the decisive voter is the12
one with the median factor (pre-fisc and pre-transfer) income. However, these data are
typically very difficult to obtain for most countries and the researchers had therefore had to
resort to using the post-tax and post-transfer income (net income) as the basis on which the
median voter makes her decision (see Perotti, 1993 and 1996,  Easterly and Rebelo 1993;
Bassett, Burkett and Putterman 1999). Thus people’s decisions about the optimal level of
taxes and transfers were made to depend on the distribution which emerges as a
consequence of that decision! Lack of data on the middle-class gain, furthermore, led to
researchers approximating the gain by the share of transfers in GDP—a very imperfect proxy
bearing in mind that many transfers may be captured by the rich. Only recently (Milanovic,
1999) have these two shortcomings, thanks to the rich data set provided by the Luxembourg
Income Survey, been overcome, and the hypothesis tested in an empirically correct way.
  (b)  Political democracy
The second major area of interest for the present survey has also suffered from definitional
and measurement problems. Some „hard“ measures of democracy, have been based, for
example, on the degree of national electoral participation. On the other hand, Bollen, 1980,
found that a measure of the percentage of the adult population who voted was either not
related to or inversely related to a number of other dimensions of a political democracy. A
certain level of participation is necessary to democracy, but above some point the meaning of
variations in participation is ambiguous. The interpretation of participation figures is further
clouded by the existence in some countries of a legal obligation to vote.
An additional problem is that a measure of level of democracy at a single point in
time is insensitive to a country’s experience of democracy over time.  Research that focuses
on the level of political democracy implicitly assumes that democracy can have a more or13
less immediate effect on inequality.  All countries with a high level of democracy (controlled
for other variables like income) are expected to have a relatively low level of income
inequality, regardless of the length of time that democratic institutions have existed.  But if the
egalitarian influence of democracy is in reality a long-term incremental effect, relatively new
democracies should not be expected to be as egalitarian as older ones, even if they have the
same level of democracy in a given year.  Thus, a reason for the failure to find a significant
negative effect of level of democracy on income inequality could be the confounding influence
of new, inegalitarian democracies.
The studies surveyed below have all used al least one of the following three proxies
for political democracy.  One group of studies identifies democracy with the voting franchise.
This approach is useful in instances where an historic episode of massive expansion of the
franchise takes place.  In the prevalent situation, however, when no such expansion is being
observed the literature has typically resorted to some subjective measures of political
democracy.  One early such measure was developed by Bollen, 1980, who defines political
democracy as „the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the
non-elite is maximized,“ suggests that democracy’s two main components are popular
sovereignty and political liberties. The first of these concerns the extent to which the elite of a
country is accountable to the non-elite. The second dimension concerns institutions through
which the non-elite can influence the decisions of the elite, including free speech, a free press,
and freedom of opposition.  Bollen then combines three indicators of popular sovereignty and
three of political liberties into a single index.
In parallel, other related measures have been developed by several authors.  All these
measures rely invariably on subjective rankings and are based on aspects of civil liberties and
political rights.  One commonly used such index is drawn from Freedom House publications14
and is derived from the work of Gastil and co-workers.  Finally, there exists the Polity III
index of democracy generated by Jaggers and Gurr, 1995.  Despite the fact that all these
indices are derived from subjective valuations and sometimes yield very different rankings for
individual countries, they exhibit a relatively high correlation between them, of over 0.80.
B. Selection bias
This refers to the bias of including some countries in a cross section analysis while excluding
others.  Typically, those included are more advanced countries with much better developed
data collection procedures than the average.  Early work, in particular, was usually based on
quite small samples of countries, because of data availability.  It is unclear how much bias this
introduces into the results; however, our survey of East European countries below – usually
excluded from most analyses – suggests that these omissions might be too important to
neglect.
  4.  Empirical evidence
The existing empirical evidence can be divided into two broad groups of studies, which are
distinguished by their proxies for democracy.  One strand of the literature associates
democracy with voting franchise.  Papers in this group typically conduct analyses of historical
episodes of expansion of the voting franchise and the subsequent trend in income inequality.
Another strand of the literature conceives of democracy in terms of civil liberties and political
rights (rights of expression, rights to organize, free press etc.) and are based on the above
described indices to measure democracy. Most of the studies belonging to this group
perform cross section analysis focusing on the link between these rights and inequality
measures.15
4.1. Voting franchise
Studies on the effects of the expansion of the voting franchise to focus on the documentation
of historical episodes.  While this methodology in itself introduces a selection bias and
precludes any sweeping generalizations, it represents the most direct effort to test economic
theories of redistribution described above.
Pelzman, 1980, is probably one of the first papers addressing the issue.  Reviewing
the evolution of government spending in a small sample of rich countries, it does not discern
any systematic effect of the expansion of voting franchise.
In contrast, Lindert, 1994, investigates a bigger panel of 21 rich countries in the
period 1880-1930, coming to the conclusion that expansion of franchise, in particular,
women suffrage, is associated with an increase in redistributive spending.
Justman and Gradstein, 1999a, following the seminal work of Dicey, 1914/1962,
document the gradual expansion of voting franchise in the 19
th century Britain and similarly
find that it was followed by a massive adoption of redistributive programs.
Husted and Kenny, 1997, examine the effect of elimination of poll taxes and literacy
tests on redistribution using a panel of 46 states in the US for 1950-88.  They find that it
resulted in a significant increase in welfare spending, but not in other government
expenditures.
Lott and Kenny, 1999, examine the evolution of women suffrage in the US in the
period from 1870 to 1940.  They find that giving women the right to vote has resulted in a
significant increase in voter’s turnout and ultimately, in a substantial increase in government
spending.16
Abrams and Settle, 1999, similarly use the Switzerland‘s extension of the franchise to
women in 1971 to test the hypothesis that redistribution is affected by the relative income of
the decisive voter, arguing that women suffrage must have lowered the income of the decisive
voter.  They find that this extension of voting rights increased Swiss social welfare spending
by 28%.
To sum up, it appears that expansion of franchise is associated with a subsequent
increase in redistribution – this, at least, is the reading of the available evidence with regard to
a (non-representative) selection of countries.  Although inequality measures do not typically
feature in the above surveyed analyses, the implication of this expansion of redistribution must
have been a decrease in inequality.
Extent of franchise, however, is of a limited value as a proxy for democracy.  One
reason is that the cross-country variation in this variable is expected to be quite small – most
of the world has achieved a formal full franchise.  Another problem is that in some countries
voting franchise may very little to do with actual political democracy – the former communist
countries being the case in point.  Thus, one is led to consider alternative, more subtle
measures based on civil liberties and political rights.
4.2. Civil liberties and political rights
Work in this direction uses subjective indices for political rights, which are based on personal
impressions by panels of experts of the extent of those rights in different countries.  Among
the most commonly used are the indices of Bollen (1980), Gastil, and Polity III (Jaggers and
Gurr, 1995).  Since most of the studies confirm a high degree of correlation between these
indices and reach similar conclusions with regard to them, we will not make such distinctions
either.17
Early work on the link between political rights and inequality is concisely reviewed in
Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990.  Sirowy and Inkeles themselves, covering 12 previous studies
come to the conclusion that „political democracy does not widely exacerbate inequality,“ and
that „the existing evidence suggests that the level of political democracy as measured at one
point in time tends not to be widely associated with lower levels of income inequality.“ (p.
151)  Specifically, six of the surveyed studies find a negative relationship between democracy
and inequality and six other studies either find a positive relationship or fail to detect any
significant association. Here we extend their survey, supplementing it with more recent
studies.  As we shall see, this leads to a somewhat different interpretation of the evidence.
We begin by summarizing the results of some of the earlier papers identified as better dealing
with some of the methodological problems reviewed above.
Bollen and Grandjean, 1981, properly controlling for the non-monotonic relationship
between economic development (by including both the logarithm of energy consumption per
capita and its square as a measures) and income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient),
did not find any significant evidence to support the view that political democracy contributes
to a more egalitarian distribution of income in a sample of fifty countries, once economic
development is controlled for.
Bollen and Jackman, 1985, reexamine the argument presented in a previous study
Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977, on the potential reciprocal relation between political
democracy and income inequality, by constructing a simultaneous-equations model for
income inequality and political democracy. Following Kuznets’ insights, they specify
inequality as a curvilinear function of the level of economic development and anticipate an
inverted U-shaped curve, with a positively signed coefficient for economic development and
a negatively signed coefficient for its square. The most important variables included in their18
investigation are: political democracy, measured by Bollen’s index of political democracy;
income inequality (the data are from World Bank sources); socioeconomic development,
measured by the gross national product per capita; and population age structure, measured
by the percentage of the population aged 0-14 years. The major result of this study is that,
again, no significant effects between democracy and inequality in either direction is found.
Some other studies have tested the effect of the length of democratic experience on
inequality.  Hewitt, 1977, for example, in a sample of 25 industrialized countries failed to find
a significant relationship, after properly controlling for other variables.
In an important study, Muller, 1988, extended the sample to 50 countries also using
the number of years of democratic experience and controlling for the extent of economic
development. The indicator of a country’s level of democracy is Bollen’s index.  Muller
reports that at least approximately 20 years of democratic experience are required for the
egalitarian effect to occur; countries with less than a generation of democracy are almost as
egalitarian, on average, than non-democracies. In other words, democratic institutions, if
maintained for a relatively long time, cause some gradual reduction of income inequality,
independent of level of economic development.  Also, a very strong inverse association is
observed between income inequality and the likelihood of stability versus breakdown of
democracy, even independent of a country’s level of economic development.  Thus, if a
democratic regime is inaugurated in a country with an extremely inegalitarian distribution of
income, high inequality is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and cause
democratic institutions to be replaced by authoritarian rule.
Summarizing the results of early research on the subject, Sirowy and Inkeles
conclude therefore that evidence on the positive effect of democracy on reducing inequality19
had been ambiguous, although the length of democratic experience (as opposed to the state
level of democracy) may have contributed to reduction in inequality.
Some recent research seems to be more conclusive.  A couple of papers done over
the past several years have used an improved inequality data set created in the World Bank
(the Deininger-Squire) to test the hypothesis that democracy reduces inequality. Note that all
the papers surveyed below use the Gastil index of political rights as opposed to Bollen’s used
in earlier studies; however, because of the high correlation between the two (typically above
0.80), this change is unlikely to matter much.
Rodrik, 1998, provides empisupport for the assertion that controlling for labor
productivity, income levels, and other possible determinants, there is a robust and statistically
significant association between the extent of democratic rights and wages as a share of GDP
received by workers. The association exists both across countries and over time within
countries (i.e., in panel regressions with fixed effects as well as in cross-section regressions).
Li, Squire and Zou, 1998, explore two channels, which are likely to generate
inequality: the political economy channel and the imperfect capital markets channel. The key
variables associated with the political economy channel (a measure of political freedom and
initial secondary schooling) and those associated with the capital market imperfection (the
initial degree of inequality in the distribution of assets as measured by the distribution of land
and a measure of financial market development) are all shown to be significant determinants
of current inequality. The results, in particular, show that expansion of political liberties
reduces inequality.
5
Simpson, 1990, finds that political democracy and income inequality are related by a
curvilinear function: inequality tops at intermediate levels of democracy.  Nielsen and
Anderson, 1995, present further limited support to this finding, although the relationship20
ceases to hold at a statistically significant level when controlling for other additional variables.
Justman and Gradstein, 1999b, likewise detect that democracy affects inequality in a
curvilinear fashion and argue that it is a better predictor of inequality than level of
development as stipulated by the Kuznets hypothesis.
The most recent paper Lundberg and Squire, 1999, which studies the simultaneous
determination of growth and inequality within the framework of an even more expanded data
set relatively to Deininger and Squire, 1996, does not discern a significant relationship
between democracy and aggregate measures of inequality, but they do find that expansion
of democracy benefits the lowest quintile of income distribution thus reducing poverty.  For
the purposes of better comparability between their results and those of other papers
reviewed in this section, note that Lundberg and Squire, 1999, are the first to include a large
sample of post communist countries of East Europe, whose transition experience may have
differed demonstrably from that of other countries - see the discussion in the following
section.
To sum up, while the earlier research failed to detect any significant correlation
between democracy and inequality, more recent studies based on improved data sets and
bigger data samples typically cautiously suggest existence of a negative relationship between
the two.  Two hypotheses seem to be especially promising in the light of this recent research:
one that defines democracy in terms of the length of democratic experience, and another that
specifies a curvilinear relationship between democracy and inequality.
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5.  East European countries: An enigma?
The transition economies’ experience appears to run counter the strand of literature
reviewed so far. Perhaps the two most dramatic changes which occurred in these countries
since they abandoned Communism –noticed by economists and casual observers alike—
were political liberalization and large increases in income inequality. Figure 1 shows on the
horizontal axis, the change in the Freedom House combined index of political freedom and
civil liberties for 21 transition countries between 1989 and 1997, and on the vertical axis, the
change in the Gini coefficient between approximately the same two dates.
7 All points fall in
the NE quadrant (both democracy and inequality increase), whereas we would expect them
to be in the SE quadrant (greater democracy, less inequality).22
Figure 1. Change in democracy and income inequality between 1988-89 and 1997
Note. Transition countries only. Change in democracy is calculated as the difference between
the Freedom House (inverted) index of civil and political freedom in 1997 and 1989. The maximum value of
the index is 14 (7 for civil freedom; 7 for political freedom); the minimum value is 2 (1 for erach). The
maximum gain would be 12. Change in the Gini index is calculated as the difference between the Ginis in
1996-98 (when available, otherwise 1993-95) and Gini in 1988-89.
Sources: for democracy, see Freedom House; for Gini, Milanovic (1998) and DEC data base.
However, Figure 1 shows also an interesting feature—namely that increases in
inequality were less in countries that became more democratic. The regression line is
negatively sloped if all countries are included,
8 and even more so if several outliers (three
Central Asian republics, Belarus, and Croatia) are left out. In other words, while
democracy and inequality increased practically in all transition economies, higher increases in
democracy were associated with lower increases in inequality. Moreover, if we simply plot














(1995-97) levels of inequality, the relationship is, as the literature suggests, a negative one
(see Figure 2).
9 This suggests that the real relationship between democracy and inequality is a
more complex one than most of the literature, based on cross-sectional analysis, has led us to
believe. There may be non-linearities such that small increases in democracy are associated
with increases in inequality, but that greater democracy chips away at these increases until the
relationship becomes negative. Or it may be (as suggested above) that the current level of
democracy is a very imperfect proxy for the real level of democracy, namely that in order for
democracy to „work“ on inequality through various redistributive mechanisms, sufficient
„democratic time“ needs to elapse. We mean by that that a sufficiently long period of
democracy is needed in order for either institutions (like tax system, social transfers) or
lobbying or countervailing groups (like trade unions, political parties) to be established.
Reduction of inequality, we think, does not occur by a democratic fiat. It requires democratic
time  (experience) to build the channels of redistribution. Thus countries that have lacked
democratic time, cannot be expected to exhibit the same (low) level of inequality than
countries with sufficient democratic experience—even if both exhibit the same current level
of democracy.24
Figure 2. Relationship between accumulated democracy (1989-97) and inequality
Note: Transition economies only. Cumulative democracy index is the sum of (inverted) Freedom
House democracy indexes between 1989 and 1997 (the maximum cumulative democracy index would be
126).
Sources: see Figure 1.
To fix the ideas, and since we are discussing transition economies, consider
Azerbaijan and Poland. During the transition, both have experienced increased inequality and
democracy. But while Azerbaijan’s barely increased democracy was accompanied by huge
increases in inequality, the reverse happened in Poland: moderate increase in inequality, and
significant expansion of democracy. Could not the much greater increase in democracy, and
also the more democratic climate which existed in Poland before the transition, have
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experience—the existence of free trade unions for some twenty years; tolerance of several,
even if powerless, parties before the transition; the strength and vibrancy of civil society
throughout the 1980’s—were all elements which did not exist in Azerbaijan. Moreover,
transition in Azerbaijan occurred in the context of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The
local elite was now free to appropriate the rents which, in a context of a unified country, it
could not. For sure, Azerbaijan might represent an extreme example of rent-grabbing simply
because there was a lot to grab thanks to large oil revenues. But substantially the same
appropriation by the local elites happened in all the new countries created after the break up
of the Soviet Union. This is, of course, an addsui generis factor which might explain large
inequality increases in the former Soviet republics.
We thus run two additional specifications of the inequality equation (on the sample of
transition economies only). The first, where we replace current level of political and civil
democracy with the cumulative level over the last 9 years. In the second regression, we add a
dummy variable for the former Soviet republics. In both cases, we control for income levels
using the 1988 values of country’s GDP per capita in PPP (equal purchasing power) dollars.
The results show that cumulative liberalization enters the regressions with the correct
(negative) sign. However, once the CIS dummy variable is introduced, its effect, in view of
large increases in inequality in CIS countries, swamps the effect of political variables, and in
neither of several formulations, are democracy variables any longer significant nor do they
have the predicted sign. 
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Table 1. Regressing inequality on democracy: transition countries
































2 adjusted (F) 0.07 0.27 0.12 0.25
Number of observations 21 21 21 21
Note: t-values between brackets.
* = significant at 5 percent. **=significant at 1 percent.
The analysis of transition economies allows us to make, we believe, some broader
tentative conclusions about the relationship between democracy and inequality. First, cross-
sectional relationship between current democracy and current inequality might not tell the
whole story: while the current levels of democracy and inequality are negatively correlated
even for transition economies, the truly important story of the 1990’s is their positive
correlation (both increased). Their evolution through time may differ from the conclusion we
would obtain from a snapshot picture (cross-section regression). Second, and related point:
to explain current inequality, one may need to use a longer-term measure of democracy:
either cumulative democracy as we have done here, or length of democratic experience.
But our analysis still begs the crucial point—this is: why did socialist countries,
characterized with strong concentration of power, exhibit very low levels of inequality (see
e.g. Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992)? For the entire discussion of the socialist enigma
would have been redundant had these countries, in accordance with theory, had very high
inequality which „goes together“ with high concentration of political power. After all, one27
may wonder what is the purpose of having a concentrated political power if it is not
accompanied by a control over economic resources, that is easy living and high welfare of the
elite? Socialist countries in the past, rather than the transitional countries now, do represent
an anomaly.
While we do not have an answer to this question, one hypothesis - which we
propose to pursue in the forthcoming research - is that, in addition to all the variables which
different researchers have considered, inequality is also a reflection of social values, or the
values held by the elite. We believe that socialist values which frowned upon excessive
wealth accumulation, explicitly banned private ownership of the means of production, made a
sharp distinction between private and personal property (the latter being control over
essentially items of current consumption), did prevent increases in income inequality. It can be
little doubted that, for example, the well-documented (Redor 1992; Phelps Brown 1988)
low income differential between skilled and unskilled workers was ideologically motivated.
These differences, since in most societies labor income accounts for 2/3 or more of total
disposable income, are the cause of most of differences in personal incomes. (Some of
ideological limitations did pay a useful political role too: not allowing people to accumulate
private wealth made it easier to control them politically, because people who had no
economic back-up in the case of political disgrace were more likely to toe the political line.)
But ideology—some of it self-serving for the elite, but most of it derived from Marx and
general left-wing ethos—must have played an important role in determining acceptable
income differences. While Communist societies were ideological, they were not the only
ideological societies. Ideology, broadly defined as religious or ethical beliefs of the ruling elite,
plays a similar role in other societies. We plan to apply, in another paper, this insight derived
from the analysis of transition economies to a broader set of countries.28
6.  Conclusion
Our review of the recent literature reveals that there are some indications regarding a positive
relation between democracy and equality.  This conclusion emerges both when democracy is
measured by the extent of the voting franchise on the basis of specific case studies and also in
cross country regressions with democracy proxied by an index based on measures of civil
liberties and political rights.  As such it provides empirical support for the existing theories of
income redistribution á la Meltzer and Richard, 1981, and others.
An important caveat to the above conclusion is exemplified by the transition
experience of post communist countries in East Europe.  While the increase in inequality
despite continuous democratization may serve as a warning signal against broad
generalizations and premature conclusions, it could also trigger additional theoretical as well
as empirical research to explain this puzzle.
Note, however, that none of the recent studies has used the length of democratic
experience as an explanatory variable, which further confounds the comparison with some of
earlier findings.  This, of course, leaves open the question of whether the increase in inequality
in post communist countries is really a puzzle that begs an explanation, or perhaps just a
transitory phenomenon, which will vanish as democracies there stabilize.
While recent research has addressed some of the methodological problems related to
the measurement of inequality and democracy, more work is needed to improve the available
databases in order to allow for better comparability across countries.  In the light of the
findings regarding the importance of the length of democratic experience, an analysis of
longitudinal data may prove important in future research.  Compilation of reliable panel data
may enhance our understanding of the interaction between the distribution of political rights29
and economic resources.  In particular, in the light of previous findings, a curvilinear
specification of the relationship between democracy and inequality deserves further attention.
Another potentially interesting direction for future research could be incorporation of the
prevailing ideology in different countries into the analysis; our preliminary discussion of the
post communist experience in East Europe suggests that this may be a fruitful avenue to
pursue.
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1 For recent summaries of the growth evidence the reader is referred to Alesina and Perotti,
1994, Helliwell, 1994, and Przeworski and Limongi, 1993.
2 Bollen and Jackman, 1985, claim that Aristotle should be credited with being the pioneer in
developing the subject.
3 In Justman and Gradstein, 1999a, the franchise varies across periods and is endogenously
determined; but for the current presentation an exogenously given constant franchise is
assumed.
4 The fact that the same conclusion is supported by an alternative political model is comforting in
the light of the somewhat inconclusive evidence regarding the median voter theory, on which
Meltzer-Richard’s model rests; see Meltzer and Richard, 1983, for a supporting view, and
Gouveia and Masia, 1998, for a dissenting evidence.
5 Although the variables associated with the financial market imperfection argument were found
to have an even greater effect on inequality.
6 Olson’s (1982) theory of redistributive coalitions may provide a formal underpinning for the
former hypothesis.
7 The Freedom House index is inverted so that its higher values show greater democracy and civil
liberties.
8 The regression is:
Change in Gini=24.03 - 0.281 change in democracy - 0.001 GDP in 1988 (in PPP dollars)
However, neither coefficient (except the constant) is statistically significant, and R
2 is only 0.14.
9 The same result obtains if we use simply level of democracy in 1997 instead of cumulative
democracy between 1989 and 1997.
10 We have tried several democracy formulations which are not reported here: simply change in
level of democracy between 1989 and 1997, number of important government changes both alone
and interacted with cumulative liberalization. All the formulations give basically the same results.